Transition of India’s Foreign Policy post Independence

The foreign policy of a country is the summation of the principles, interests and objectives that the country seeks to achieve through its relations with other countries. It is formulated to defend and advance its national advantages in its conduct of relations with other nations, reciprocally and multilaterally. It is an immediate impression of a country’s customary values and overall national policies, aspirations and self-perception. Therefore, the conduct of a country’s policies are governed by the sum total of numerous determinants, institutions, processes and personalities.

India’s foreign policy has undergone various changes and amendments. Through this article, we analyze the transition of India’s foreign policy through 4 phases, 1947–1962, 1962–1991, 1991–2014 and 2014- 2021.

First Phase (1947–1962)

The period 1947–1962 was an “era of optimistic non-alignment”. Nehru saw India’s role as a “peacemaker” by playing a role of moderating Cold war tensions and avoiding the Asian region from becoming an area of East-West contention, while simultaneously upholding India’s security. He gave emphasis on Nuclear Disarmament and building Multilateral Institutions in order to promote global peace. This period’s policies gave less emphasis on security building and military expenditure, but rather promoted economic development. The development towards non-alignment took form in 1954 in Colombo, Sri Lanka, where Nehru, echoed the stance of Zhou Enlai, in formulating the Doctrine of Panch Sheel. This policy of non-alignment was primarily aimed to maintain national independence by not joining any military alliance of the USA or the Soviet Union. Herein, Nehru was concerned about the opportunity cost of defence spending. He feared that any involvement with either of the two blocs would lead India to divert essential resources from the economic development goal. He was also determined to maintain India’s hard-won struggle for independence. This phase ended with the India-China War in 1962.

Second Phase (1962–1991)

This period was marked by the two wars with Pakistan. Pakistan was confident about getting US support and deployed US weapons but still failed. The Tashkent Agreement was signed post this, as a peace declaration, for both parties to withdraw all armed forces.

Under Indira Gandhi, there was a radical shift that prioritized Indian interests in the subcontinent. There was a complete shift from Nehru’s peacekeeping ideal to Indira Gandhi’s Security Seeking. This period saw an inclination toward balance-of-power politics and a greater willingness to use coercive tactics and force. Countering the US-China alliance India entered an agreement with the USSR in 1971. India emerged as a prominent power in South Asia. The nuclear test in 1974 was an indicator of the same. The domestic problems during the 1980s lead to greater engagement with the world and especially with other countries in Asia. Under Rajiv Gandhi, the foreign policy was said to be ‘muscular’. India’s South Asian neighbourhood started to sense a threat of the ‘big-brother and India’s relations with immediate neighbours started deteriorating. During this period, new regional and sub-regional groupings emerged, primarily cooperation for technological, economic and commercial purposes. India also developed better relations with China and the US.

Third Phase (1991–2014)

During the third phase, also referred to as the Post Cold War period, India started seeking foreign direct investment. Access to markets in the developed world as the realization of falling behind the rest of the world started hitting the country. Simultaneously, to match the capabilities of the biggest economies of the world, P.V. Narasimha Rao introduced a new model of economic reforms known as the LPG or Liberalisation, Privatisation and Globalisation model. The chain of reforms that occurred with respect to business, manufacturing, and monetary administrations ventures was designated at lifting the economy of the country to a more capable level.

Gujral doctrine, propounded by the 12th Prime Minister of India, Inder Kumar Gujral, targeted constructing a cooperative and dispute-free South Asia and simultaneously assembling scaffolds of advancement participation with the South Asian neighbours. Thereafter, during Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s government, he focused on two significant settling measures: a casual ban on additional atomic tests and a guarantee to “No First Use” (NFU) of atomic weapons as per his guarantee to move India from nuclear ambiguity post the Pokhran test of 1974. Another major policy implemented in the third phase was the Look East Policy. Launched in 1992, this policy was expected to contribute significantly to India’s globalization efforts, integration with the world economy and make up for the shortfall brought by the collapse of the Soviet Union, its significant exchanging accomplice and help other nations in beating its segregation from an overall phenomenon of joining regionalism.

Manmohan Singh’s Government has continued the pragmatic foreign policy that was started by P.V. Narasimha Rao and continued by BJP’s Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Furthermore, he also signed the Civil Nuclear 123 agreement with the US for a tranquil atomic participation arrangement for significant exchanges of atomic material or equipment from the United States. On account of Pakistan, Singh drew in with three progressive governments and made a few harmonious suggestions. For China’s situation, a few certain building measures were dispatched to keep up with business as usual along the Line of Actual Control under two distinct systems in Beijing.

Fourth Phase (2014- 2021)

The foreign policy under Narendra Modi from 2014–2021 had a proactive and pragmatic approach. Modi’s foreign policy is centred around further developing relations with adjoining nations in South Asia, drawing in the extended neighbourhood of Southeast Asia and the major worldwide forces. To further develop the relations with ASEAN, and other East Asian nations, Act East Policy replacing the two-decade-old Look East Policy was implemented. Another major policy implemented by the Modi government was the Neighbourhood First Policy which effectively centres around further developing ties with India’s immediate neighbours. With proposals of upgraded financial and security collaboration, India began to connect its oceanic neighbours through the Indian Ocean Outreach Policy. India wanted to project that it had essential supremacy over the IOR and that its relations with its oceanic neighbours were definitely more agreeable than that of China’s with specific reference to the South China ocean. On the rear of developing Chinese maritime activity in the Indian Ocean region, which India considers it's area of responsibility, the Modi government has presented Project Mausam, which is accepted to match the Chinese Maritime Silk Road (MSR) drive. Another innovative foreign policy of the Modi government is the initiation of components of paradiplomacy in India’s foreign policy where each state and the urban area would be urged to manufacture exceptional connections with nations or bureaucratic conditions of another nation or even urban areas of their interest.

Conclusion

Although we believe that there is an element of subjectivity that comes into play while making foreign policy decisions, India’s foreign policy decisions are driven by strategic interests, as the country progresses to find its position in the global economy and live up to its potential, this becoming a powerful force.

India’s capability for becoming an agent of change is significant in a number of key areas. Given India’s exceptional military and soft-power capabilities, we anticipate that it will become more active in creating a regional security regime and in pushing stability outwards. In the broad area of counter-terrorism, whether through intelligence sharing, interdiction, military training or teaching about multi-ethnic and religious engagement, India has a wide variety of experience and resources from which to draw. And finally, perhaps most importantly for India, in the areas of health, education and agriculture, India has gaps to fill. In the present scenario, with the presence of many leaders, many of whom have access to nuclear weapons, there is always a perpetual looming threat of war and international tension. Understanding the underlying factors that affect decision making and gauging the political interests of various states makes room for the prediction of foreign policy patterns. Control and methods of predicting political decisions pose crucial to prevent possibly disastrous outcomes in the future. Having considered all these factors, many questions arise which are important and perhaps need more research in the field of foreign policy and international politics.

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